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Abstract: The object of this article is to argue that section 73A(5) of the Competition Act of 1998 is 
constitutional. Some commentators have argued that this provision creates reverse onus offence and is 
therefore unconstitutional. The article argues against this view, necessarily because section 73A(5) 
does not implicate any of the definitional elements of the offence created by section 73A, which 
relates to the malfeasance committed by the director of the firm in causing the firm to engage in 
prohibited practice, and it is for this malfeasance that the director is criminally charged. The fact that 
the firm had been found guilty of involvement in prohibited practice in different proceedings would 
not per se lead to the director's conviction at the criminal trial. The state would still be required to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the director was involved in causing the firm to engage in 
prohibited practice. It is asserted that if section 73A(5) creates a reverse onus, such does not relate to 
the elements of the offence with which the director has been charged but such onus is evidentiary in 
nature. Furthermore, if this provision creates a reverse onus offence and limits the director's right to 
be presumed innocent, such limitation is constitutional.  
Keywords: Presumption of innocence; reverse onus; burden of proof; beyond reasonable doubt, 
evidentiary burden 
JEL Classification: K10 
 
1. Introduction 
In light of the unmitigated involvement of firms in cartel activities, parliament 
decided to pass legislation criminalising conduct of the directors personally 
involved in causing the firms to engage in cartel activities. This is in addition to 
administrative fines imposed on the firms. However, during the parliamentary 
hearings leading to the promulgation of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 
a number of commentators such as Briscoe, (2009, p. 9) argued that section 73A(5) 
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of this Act is unconstitutional in that it creates a ‘reverse onus’ offence against an 
accused. This Act has since been inserted in the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the 
Competition Act). Although it has been signed into law by the President and some 
of its provisions have come into operation, section 73A(5) is not as yet operational. 
Despite the President returning the Bill to Parliament before signing it for 
reconsideration owing to concerns raised regarding the reverse onus issue as it is 
the President’s prerogative in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 to do so, Parliament has since passed this provision without alteration 
whatsoever as Parliament is not convinced that this provision is unconstitutional 
(Boniwell & Ostrovsky, 2009, p. 19). Briscoe (2009, p. 9) has argued that section 
73A(5) violates an accused’s right to be presumed innocent. Section 73A(5) 
provides that: 
“In any court proceedings against a person in terms of this section, an 
acknowledgement in a consent order contemplated in section 49D by the firm or a 
finding by the Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court that the firm 
has engaged in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1)(b, is prima facie 
proof of the fact that the firm engaged in that conduct” (for the sake of brevity, in 
this note reference to the “Competition Tribunal” (the Tribunal) must be read to 
include “or the Competition Appeal Court”). 
This article seeks to critically analyse the impact section 73A(5) would have on an 
accused right to a fair trial, in particular the right to be presumed innocent. It is 
organised into six parts: (ii) rationale for and methodology of the study; (iii) an 
overview of the definition of the concept of reverse onus; (iv) the analysis of 
whether section 73A(5) creates a reverse onus offence; (v) and whether the 
provision limits the right to be presumed innocent, and if so whether the limitation 
passes the constitutional muster. 
 
2. Rationale and Methodology 
The objective of this contribution is to analyse the constitutionality of section 
73A(5) of the Competition Act, to ascertain whether it creates a reverse onus 
offence. In principle, the purpose of section 73A is to hold directors of firms that 
have been found to have engaged in prohibited practices personally criminally 
liable. This is geared towards deterring future cases. Before the introduction of 
section 73A, liability for engaging in prohibited practice stopped at the firm’s door 
step in a form of administrative fine. Section 73A(5) in particular, is meant to avoid 
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the leading of evidence with regard to the guilt of the firm at the administrative 
proceedings in the director’s criminal case. In other words, the criminal court has 
to admit as a proven fact that the firm is guilty of prohibited practice. It is argued 
by some that this creates a reverse onus offence. Reverse onus offences offends 
against the constitutionally protected right to be presumed innocent and the right to 
remain silent among others. 
The ultimate goal of this article is to illustrate that section 73A(5) has been 
carefully crafted as to not impinge on any of the rights of the accused person. The 
worst that the provision does is to allow a criminal court to admit as a proven fact 
the proceedings at the Tribunal regarding the guilt of the firm. This has no potential 
of reflecting on the accused person as having being involved in the causing of the 
firm to engage in prohibited practice. The accused person is not criminally charged 
for the misdeeds of the firm per se but for the role that s/he personally played in 
causing the firm to engage in prohibited practice. The method adopted in this paper 
is qualitative. Legislation, case law and other secondary sources such as books and 
journal articles have been used as instruments of analysis. 
 
3. An Overview and Definition of Reverse Onus 
Section 35 of the Constitution guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed 
innocent until proven otherwise. The effect of this fundamental principle is that the 
prosecution is bound to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements 
of the offence in question. Failure by the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt any of the elements of the offence in question an accused must be acquitted. 
There is no procedural duty on an accused to rebut the allegations of that accused’s 
guilt or even of establishing a defence (Joubert, 2009, p. 18). The presumption of 
innocence doctrine is embodied in the notion that it is the duty of the state to prove 
each and every element of a crime with which an accused is charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The case of S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 26, serves 
the purpose of illustrating that this doctrine is a safeguard against the risk of 
innocent persons being wrongfully convicted. The rationale for burdening the state 
with the duty of proving the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt is 
founded in the understanding that it is inexcusable to convict the innocent than it 
would be to let the guilty go free (Schwikkard, 1999, p. 1). In S v Bhulwana; S v 
Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) and S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC), the 
Constitutional Court has held that as a general rule reverse onus presumptions lead 
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to an accused being convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to that 
accused’s guilt and, therefore, unreasonably infringes an accused right to be 
presumed innocent. 
In S v Zuma (supra para 41), the Constitutional Court held that not all offences 
based on presumptions amount to an unreasonable limitation of the right to be 
presumed innocent. However, such offences have to meet the strict constitutional 
prescription that the state bears the onus of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all 
elements of the offence in question. This was emphasized in Osman v Attorney-
General for the Transvaal 1998 (4) SA 1224 (CC) para 13. According to Dlamini 
(2002, p. 7), South African law presupposes that the usual effect of a presumption 
is either to assist a party in discharging an onus or to place an onus or duty to 
adduce evidence on his opponent. Clearly, therefore, the application of a 
presumption affects the “incidence of the onus” or creates “an artificial duty” to 
adduce evidence on certain issues. 
In other words, the duty to prove a fact in the proceedings is removed from a party 
which (ordinarily) ought to bear it to another (Dlamini, 2001, p. 556). 
Presumptions have been found to defy any precise definition and, as a result, are 
classified according to the effect they may have on the incidence of the onus of 
proof (Schwikkard, 2009, pp. 498-502). Zeffertt and Paizes (2009, p. 181) also 
share this view. They intimate that “[t]he adoption of different categories [of 
presumptions], could, perhaps, have been beneficial – for instance, to emphasise 
that a rebuttable presumption of law may affect either the onus in its true sense or 
the evidentiary burden.” By “onus in its true sense” these authors simply refer to a 
situation in which “[o]nce a certain set of facts is established, an element of the 
offence is presumed to have been proved and the accused is required to produce 
evidence on a preponderance of probabilities to rebut that presumption”. This was 
emphasized in Scagell v Attorney-General of Western Cape 1997 (2) SA 368 (CC) 
para 7 and Bhulwana (supra, para 7).  
In other words, the prosecution is relieved of the onus of proving the presumed 
fact. Such a presumption operates as conclusive proof of the presumed fact against 
an accused unless an accused produces evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption 
on a balance of probabilities. A conviction of an accused may, therefore, hinge on 
the presumed fact. This may lead to a conviction of an accused even where the 
evidence presented before court is insufficient to justify a conviction. “Evidentiary 
burden” on the other hand calls for an accused to adduce sufficient evidence to 
disprove a prima facie case established by the state against that accused (see 
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Scaggell, supra, paras 11-12; Zuma, supra, para 41). It does not automatically 
follow that an accused who fails to rebut a presumption that establishes an 
evidentiary burden would be convicted – the prosecution will still need to prove the 
presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt (Bhulwana supra, para 7). It was in this 
context that the Constitutional Court cautioned against the possibility of an accused 
being convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to that accused’s 
guilt, due to a reverse onus presumption which relieves the state of part of its duty. 
That would be a breach of the right to be presumed innocent (Bhulwana supra, para 
15).  
The criteria upon which the presumption of innocence are premised can be 
summed up as follows: (a) The state bears the onus of proof; (b) such proof must 
be beyond a reasonable doubt; (c) an accused remains legally innocent unless and 
until the state has discharged its onus (Schwikkard, 1998, pp. 396-397). It is 
therefore against these criteria that the analysis of whether or not s 73A(5) breaches 
the right to be presumed innocent must be undertaken. 
 
4. Does Section 73A(5) Create a Reverse Onus Offence? 
The unconstitutionality argument of section 73A(5) stems from the 
mischaracterisation of this provision as setting out (at least one of) the definitional 
elements of this offence. This view seem justified when section 73A(5) is read with 
section 75A(3). In terms of the latter section it is a prerequisite that the firm has to 
be found guilty by the Tribunal of involvement in a prohibited practice for an 
accused to be criminally prosecuted. This section provides that: ‘Subject to 
subsection (4), a person may be prosecuted for an offence in terms of this section 
only if– 
a) The relevant firm has acknowledged, in a consent order contemplated in section 
49D, that it engaged in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1)(b); or 
b) The Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court has made a finding 
that the relevant firm engaged in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1)(b).’ 
This section seems to suggest that an accused is prosecuted for the malfeasance of 
the firm. However, a careful reading of the entire section 73A indicates otherwise. 
The conviction of the firm for involvement in a prohibited practice is not the basis 
for the prosecution of an accused. Rather, an accused is prosecuted for that accused 
own individual indiscretion. It is noteworthy that section 73A does not create a 
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strict or vicarious liability offence. A strict liability offence implies that the 
prosecution need not prove the mental guilt of an accused. If it could be proven that 
an offence had been committed by an accused, despite an accused culpability, that 
accused would be convicted for the offence (Snyman, 2008, p. 245). A vicarious 
liability offence on the other hand refers to an offence where an accused is liable 
for a crime despite the fact that that accused did not commit it but the offence was 
committed by someone who has a legal relationship with an accused. In this 
context the liability of an accused would emanate from the relationship an accused 
has with the actual wrongdoer. Like in the strict liability offence, culpability is not 
a requirement for a conviction (Snyman, 2008, p. 250).  
The presumption of the firm’s involvement in a prohibited practice does not and 
will not, without more, be sufficient to lead to an accused’s conviction. The 
prosecution is still burdened with the duty of proving that an accused had the 
requisite mens rea and was actually involved in the firm’s commission of a 
prohibited practice. This is made clear by section 73A(1) which provides that, in 
order to secure a conviction of an accused, the prosecution must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (a) Whilst an accused was a director of the firm or was 
engaged in a position with managerial authority; (b) s/he has caused the firm to 
engage or has knowingly acquiesced in the firm engaging in anti-competitive 
behaviour (Kelly, 2010, p. 331). For the sake of convenience, in this note “has 
caused the firm to engage...” must be read to include “has knowingly acquiesced in 
the firm engaging...”). These are what constitute the definitional elements of the 
section 73A offence. Snyman (2008, p. 30) describes the definitional elements of 
an offence as ‘[t]he concise description of the type of conduct proscribed by the 
law and the circumstances in which it must take place in order to constitute a 
crime. Neither does section 73A(3) nor (5) (read singly or together) describe the 
conduct or the circumstance which are proscribed by s 73A. The criminalised 
conduct and the circumstances under which such conduct would have to take place 
are spelled out in section 73A(1).  
It is trite that the yardstick for measuring the constitutionality of a presumption is 
whether such a presumption operates against an accused on a definitional element 
of the offence in issue. In other words, where a presumption lessens the standard 
which the prosecution is generally expected to meet as regard a definitional 
element of an offence, such a presumption is unconstitutional. In S v Meaker 1998 
(2) SACR 76 (W) p. 84, Cameron, J., writing in a different context, observed that 
where the purpose of a presumption is “not to lock the accused into the crime by 
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associating him or her, through a fact presumed with the commission of the 
offence” then such presumption is not unconstitutional. The only effect that section 
73A(5) would have in the case against an accused is that the prosecution is relieved 
of a duty to prove that the firm was engaged in a prohibited practice and to forestall 
an accused from raising as a defence that the firm was not involved in a prohibited 
practice. However, the prosecution will still have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the definitional elements of the offence in question (Kelly, 2010, p. 331). 
This provision was carefully crafted to ensure that no accused could be convicted 
despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to that accused’s guilt, despite the 
firm having being engaged in prohibited practice. Why border charge the director 
for having caused the firm to engage in anti-competitive behaviour when the firm 
was actually never engaged in a prohibited practice in the first place? That would 
be ludicrous to say the least. It would be disingenuous to maintain that once the 
prosecution has been relieved of the duty to prove that the firm was engaged in a 
prohibited practice that would automatically result in the conviction of an accused 
despite a court entertaining a reasonable doubt as to whether that accused caused 
the firm to engage in such a practice.  
It should be borne in mind that the proceedings against the firm in terms of the 
Competition Act are administrative in nature and the standard of proof is one on a 
balance of probabilities compared to the stricter criminal standard of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt with which the accused case would have to be adjudged (Kelly, 
2010, p. 328). It would be unfair that a criminal court would accept a record of 
proceedings which have been proven on a lesser standard as evidence against an 
accused in the latter’s criminal trial for breaching section 73A(1). This is not the 
case here. None of the elements envisaged by section 73A(1) is implicated by 
section 73A(5). What section 73A(5) does is to direct a criminal court to accept an 
acknowledgement by the firm or the proceedings from the Tribunal as prima facie 
proof against the firm that the firm itself was engaged in a prohibited practice – not 
the accused. The Constitutional Court has held that ‘[a]s a general rule in our law, 
the formulation “shall be prima facie evidence” does not impose the burden of 
proof on an accused, but merely gives rise to an evidential burden’ (Scagell, supra, 
para 11). However, such prima facie proof is not without consequences. Failure to 
rebut this prima facie proof with credible evidence becomes conclusive proof of the 
issue at hand as propounded in S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA) para 53. It 
is illuminating that the prejudicial consequences, if any, which might flow from the 
‘presumption’ in this case would not operate against the accused.  
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The proponents for the unconstitutionality of section 73A(5) will do well to heed 
O’Regan J counsel in S v Coetzee 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC) para 162, that; “The 
general principle of our common law is that criminal liability arises only where 
there has been unlawful conduct and blameworthiness or fault (the actus reus and 
mens rea). ... [T]he requirement of fault or culpability is an important part of 
criminal liability in our law. This requirement is not an incidental aspect of our 
law relating to crime and punishment, it lies at its heart.” 
All these factors (unlawful conduct and blameworthiness) have to be proven by the 
state beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused could be convicted. The proof 
of the firm’s engagement in prohibited practice falls short to satisfy this standard. It 
warrants mention that the unlawful and blameworthy conduct for which an accused 
is charged is that of the accused and not the firm. Section 73A does not 
automatically ascribe the firm’s malfeasance to an accused. According to Boniwell 
and Ostrvsky (2009, p. 20), “[t]he presumption created by this provision relates to 
the conduct of the company without a corresponding inference as to any element of 
guilt on the part of the director”. 
At best for those who argue that section 73A(5) creates a reverse onus that onus is 
evidentiary. Even this assertion rests on shaky grounds. If regard is had to the 
effect of this provision on the case of an accused, it becomes patently clear that the 
provision does not even create an evidentiary burden as against that accused. 
Indeed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary (that the firm has engaged in 
prohibited activity, which will, in all likelihood, never be forthcoming) the court 
will accept as conclusive proof that the firm to the exclusion of an accused was 
involved in a prohibited practice. This is an issue that does not implicate an 
accused.  
Section 73A(5) does not, neither expressly nor by reasonable implication, compel 
an accused to offer any explanation with regard to the firm’s conviction with the 
result of a conviction should there be failure to do so. This ineluctably leads to the 
conclusion that the proponents of the unconstitutionality argument disregard the 
gravamen of section 73A(5). The mischief of section 73A(5) is to eliminate the 
possibility of an accused raising flimsy defences (or arguments) against irrefutable 
facts already proven at the administrative proceedings (Kelly op cit at 330-31). The 
target of this provision, therefore, is not the directors of the firm that has been 
involved in a prohibited practice, but those directors who have played an active 
part in the firm’s engagement in anti-competitive behaviour (see Coetzee, supra, 
para 59). The offence is not dependent on one being a director of the ‘convicted’ 
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firm but, in addition, on one causing the convicted firm to engage in anti-
competitive behaviour (Coetzee (supra, para 203).  
In Bhulwana, (supra, para 8), the Constitutional Court stated that the effect of a 
reverse onus provision is that an accused may be convicted despite the existence of 
a reasonable doubt of that accused’s guilt. Section 73A(5) does not lend itself to 
this criterion. Even if, as it would mostly happen when criminal proceedings are 
initiated in terms of section 73A, the accused does not dispute the admittance of the 
proceedings from the administrative tribunal that the firm was engaged in a 
prohibited activity as prima facie proof against the firm, the accused runs no risk of 
conviction at all. Put differently, section 73A(5) does not engender a position 
where an accused could be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as 
to that accused’s guilt. Section 73A(5) does not allocate risk in any form to an 
accused should that accused fail (or rather elect not) to persuade the court that the 
presumed fact (engagement of the firm in a prohibited practice) did not take place 
(Schwikkard,p. 18). 
On the contrary section 73A(1) requires that the prosecution prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that whilst the director of the firm an accused caused the firm to 
engage in anti-competitive behaviour. Section 73A(5) does not assist the state in 
the presentation of its case against an accused (Dlamini, 2001, p. 545). The rule 
created by section 73A(5) does not directly relate to the material elements of the 
offence with which an accused is charged. Even at the most benign of 
interpretations of this provision in favour of the prosecution the provision fails to, 
at the very least, establish the evidentiary onus that needs to be rebutted by an 
accused (Schwikkard op cit at 19). It is hard to comprehend how a rule created 
exclusively against a third person who is not even party to the proceedings and not 
implicating the party engaged in such proceedings could be said to create a reverse 
onus against the latter. Section 73A(5) fails the reverse onus test articulated by the 
Constitutional Court in Bhulwana (supra, paras 8 and 13): Given the evidence 
before court would the court be in the position to convict but for the presumption 
against an accused. That is not the effect of section 73A(5). To argue otherwise 
would be to conflate issues and tarring the accused and the firm with the same 




5. Would Section 73A(5) Pass the Limitation Test? 
Even if s 73A(5) impinges on the accused right to be presumed innocent, this 
provision is constitutional for another reason. Section 36(1) of the Constitution 
provides for the limitation of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights in the 
following terms: 
‘The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all the relevant factors, including,  
a) the nature of the right;  
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’  
This provision indicates that no right in the Bill of Rights is absolute. However, 
this does not imply that rights could be limited at the whims of the powers that be. 
Section 36 of the Constitution provides for the “justifiable infringement” of rights. 
In other words, rights must be limited for cogent and compelling reasons which are 
constitutionally sound (Currie & de Waal, 2005, p. 164). 
The gambit in the limitation analysis is the allegation that a fundamental right of an 
applicant has been impinged by “law of general application”. Indisputably, section 
73A(5) satisfies the requirement of law of general application. Once this has been 
satisfied the state bears a duty to prove that the infringement is in accordance with 
the values and ethos entrenched in the Constitution – that “the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom...” In order to determine whether a limitation of a 
right passes the constitutional muster the drafters of the Constitution delineated 
five factors that have to be taken into account in the limitation analysis. It is 
noteworthy however that this list is not numerus clausus. In other words, they are a 
guide of what the courts have to consider in the limitation exercise. The 
constitutional drafters envisioned that, in the limitation analysis, a delicate balance 
would have to be struck between the “conflicting rights and interests of the 
individuals” on the one hand and the “broader social costs and benefits” on the 
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other (Woolman & Botha, 2010, pp. 67–70). Put in a different way, “[t]his enquiry 
involves a weighing up of competing values and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality” (Coetzee (supra) para 11).  
Although the Constitutional Court has, at times, considered these factors 
sequentially, sight should not be lost that of importance in the limitation analysis is 
the overarching notion that the limitation must promote the values and ethos 
underlying the constitutional edifice and these factors are therefore not individually 
definitive. This was emphasized in Beinash v Ernst and Young 1999 (2) SA 116 
(CC) paras 16-21. According to Currie and de Waal (2005, p. 178), these factors 
are not ‘a checklist of requirements’. Thus, a court seized with the limitation 
analysis need not necessarily scrutinise each and every factor listed in section 36 of 
the Constitution to come to a conclusion that a right has been reasonably and 
justifiably limited. This was highlighted in Malachi v Cape Dance Academy 
International (Pty) Ltd 2010 (6) SA 1 (CC) para 36-40.  
The importance of the right to be presumed innocent cannot be gainsaid. However, 
like all other rights in the Constitution there comes a moment when it has to yield 
to the benefit of the broader constitutional scheme. The purpose sought to be 
fulfilled by this provision is an important one. Failure to admit, at the criminal 
proceedings of an accused, the record of proceedings that the firm was found guilty 
of involvement in malfeasance would be so unreasonable as to be ridiculous 
(Davids, 1968, p. 74). It would serve to undermine the administration of justice. 
Why border rehash evidence against the firm already given at the Tribunal’s 
hearing when its impact on the trial of an accused is inconsequential. 
The balancing act required by section 36 of the Constitution of necessity calls for 
an analysis of “why” and “how” a right has been limited. These are the two most 
important questions in the limitation test. First, the “why” must pass the 
constitutional muster before the “how” could be considered. It is only when both 
these questions have passed the constitutional hurdle could a right be said to have 
been reasonably and justifiably limited. It is therefore legitimate for a party 
claiming the limitation of a right to state that the benefits that derive from the 
limitation would be enormous (the “why’) and that the right would be 
insignificantly infringed (the “how”). The limitation of the right to be presumed 
innocent designed by section 73A(5) fits snugly with the purpose for which it was 
designed to achieve. Moreover, this right has not been limited more than is 




Furthermore, the operation of this provision does not heighten for a moment the 
risk of an innocent accused being convicted. The court would still have to satisfy 
itself that an accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for it to convict. That the 
firm has been convicted is not conclusive of the issues before the criminal court. 
The effect of section 73A(5) is not to procure a conviction or evidence against an 
accused, but rather to prove that the firm had been convicted at administrative 
proceedings. A fact that, as already stated, is unlikely to be disputed at the criminal 
proceedings. This fact alone is sufficient to render the limitation of the right to be 
presumed innocent in this case constitutional. The apposite test for a justifiable 
limitation of rights has been succinctly set out by Currie and de Waal in the 
following terms: 
“To satisfy the limitation test then, it must be shown that the law in question serves 
a constitutionally acceptable purpose and that there is sufficient proportionality 
between the harm done by the law (the infringement of fundamental rights) and the 
benefits it is designed to achieve (the purposes of the law)” (p. 176). 
Moreover, section 235 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 already allows a 
criminal court to admit the record of judicial proceedings as prima facie proof that 
any matter purporting to be recorded thereon was correctly recorded. This 
provision makes the objection of section 73A(5) futile. Even without section 
73A(5) the Tribunal proceedings would in any event find their way into the 
criminal trial. As stated already it is unlikely that the accused would dispute the 
correctness of the guilty verdict of the firm at the Tribunal’s hearing.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This article has illustrated that spiralling cases of cartel activity, despite the 
existence of administrative fines for the firms found guilty of involvement in this 
activity, propelled the legislature to consider burdening individuals with criminal 
charges. Although this was not a novel invention, it faced a stiff resistance from 
those who argued that it would not be worthwhile. The major point of contention 
was that this provision is unconstitutional because it creates a reverse onus offence. 
It is argued that section 73A(5) has been drafted to maintain a delicate and 
necessary balance between the right of the accused person to be presumed innocent 
and the state responsibility to effectively prosecute those individuals involved in 
causing the firms to engage in prohibited practices. There are no suggestions that 
the accused may be charged for having caused the firm to engage in prohibited 
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practice when the firm had actually not engaged in such a practice. It also seems 
far-fetched that the accused charged with having caused the firm to engage in 
prohibited practice will dispute that the firm has been found guilty by a Tribunal, a 
neutral factor as to his guilt. Thus, it is submitted that section 73A(5) does not 
impinge on the accused right to be presumed innocent. 
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